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Introduction
The gallery of Reykjavík City Hall erupted in
protest, and cries of “Unfit City Council!” rained
down on the representatives. The votes had
come in—the council had approved the decision
to sell the city’s stake in the geothermal energy
firm, HS Orka. Public assets had been bought
and sold before, but this was different. For the
first time, Icelandic geothermal interests were
being transferred directly to the control of a for-
eign, private entity. (“Reykjavík City Council…”)
This episode was just one step in a con-
troversial series of acquisitions from 2009 to
2011 that turned over ownership of HS Orka
to the Canadian firm Magma Energy Corp. As
Iceland struggled to recover from the banking
collapse, its citizens were understandably wary
of new private companies entering the scene,
especially concerning one of the nation’s most
prized natural resources. On the other hand, the
infusion of such foreign investment held poten-
tial to bolster the weakened economy. While the
debate polarized the nation, one thing was clear:
the precedents set concerning the role of pri-
vate and foreign interests in the geothermal
energy sector would affect the course of the
nation for generations to come.
This article presents a critical evaluation
of privatization in Iceland’s geothermal energy
sector, arguing for limitations on the extent of
private and foreign participation. After a discus-
sion of the geothermal industry and the legal
and regulatory framework within which it oper-
ates, the political environment and public
response surrounding the issue are explored.
Global comparisons that serve as historical indi-
cators of the effects of energy privatization are
also examined. Finally, the future outlook is
considered along with steps that can be taken
to ensure responsible stewardship of Iceland’s
geothermal resources.
Iceland’s Geothermal Sector
Situated on the mid-Atlantic ridge between
the North American and Eurasian plates, Ice-
land lies in one of the most tectonically active
regions on Earth. (“Geothermal Develop-
ment…”) Although Iceland’s abundance of more
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than 200 volcanoes has occasionally proved dis-
ruptive (as with Eyjafjallajökull in 2010), the
energy coursing beneath the surface has been a
critical asset for decades. The development of its
native energy resources is often cited as a pri-
mary factor in the transformation of Iceland
from one of the poorest countries in Europe
to one of the most affluent in the world. (Grims-
son) As nations across the globe look with
apprehension toward rising energy demand and
the environmental impact of fossil fuel use, Ice-
landers can boast of already deriving 82 percent
of their primary energy from indigenous renew-
able sources (Eggertsson et al.); 62 percent of
Iceland’s energy demand is met with geother-
mal resources, through district heating and hot
water and with geothermally generated electric-
ity. Although the growth of geothermal heating
leveled off in the 1980s, geothermal electricity
generation has increased since that time, espe-
cially since 1998. As shown in Figure 1, gen-
eration of electricity from geothermal energy
expanded more than seven-fold from 1998 to
2008. Energy-intensive industry, such as alu-
minum smelting, represents the largest use of
geothermal electricity, and growth in that sec-
tor could create additional demand in coming
years. The geothermal energy industry occupies
a prominent and expanding role in the Icelandic
economy and holds strategic value that justifies
careful and effective management.
The five major companies of the geot-
hermal energy sector exhibit a substantial diver-
sity in size, range of operations, and ownership.
By their nature, geothermal resources facilitate
the coupling of heating, water, and electrical
utilities, and firms engage in combinations of
these three activities to varying degrees. The
largest, Reykjavík Energy, is a municipally
owned service company that maintains Iceland’s
largest geothermal district heating system
(capacity 1150 MWt1) (Ragnarsson) and operates
two cogeneration (heat and electricity) geother-
mal plants (total capacity 333 MWe). (“Geother-
mal Development…”) In northeastern Ice-
land, state-owned Landsvirkjun provides 63.2
MWe and municipally owned Húsavík Energy
supplies 2.0 MWe. (Richter) Finally, formed
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Figure 1
Generation of Electricity Using Geothermal Energy, 1969-2009
Source: “Geothermal Development…,” p. 20.
1
1 MWt = 1 million watts thermal output; 1 MWe =
1 million watts electrical output.
from the demerger of Hitaveita Sudernesja (HS),
HS Orka operates geothermal plants (150 MWt,
176.4 MWe), and HS Veita provides heating,
electricity, and water utilities. HS Orka is the
first energy company in Iceland to have been
privatized, and, at the time of this writing, is 75
percent owned by Magma Energy Sweden A.B.
(“HS Orka…”) Because there are few market
participants, each major firm has a relatively
large impact on the overall market; for instance,
by acquiring HS Orka, Magma Energy gained
control over nearly one third of Iceland’s total
geothermal generation capacity.
Legal and Regulatory Framework
The legal and regulatory structure of the
Icelandic energy sector defines the balance of
public, corporate, and government interests and
is thus critical to understanding the role of
newly privatized and foreign-owned energy
firms. Legislation enacted from 1998 to 2008
introduced a number of changes codifying law
relating to the ownership and utilization of nat-
ural resources. In addition, the shift within
the EU toward energy deregulation prompted
Iceland to deregulate its electricity sector, lead-
ing to restructuring and paving the way for
privatization.
Act on Survey and Utilization of   
Ground Resources
Act 57/1998: Act on Survey and Utiliza-
tion of Ground Resources established the means
by which geothermal resources can be sought
and exploited. Prospecting and surveying of
geothermal resources are supervised by the Min-
istry of Industry, Energy, and Tourism and its
subdivision, the National Energy Authority.
(“Geothermal Development…”) Utilization of
geothermal resources, whether on public or pri-
vate land, is subject to licensing from the Min-
ister of Industry, who has the authority to
revoke licenses if conditions are not fulfilled
by the holders. Through these measures, the
Icelandic government is able to manage and
direct the extent of geothermal development.
Electricity Act
As a member of the European Economic
Area (EEA), Iceland was bound by EU Direc-
tive 96/92/EC on internal electricity markets
to deregulate its power system. (Hreinsson,
“Deregulation…”) The Icelandic Electricity Act
No. 65/2003 is based on the framework provided
by this directive (succeeded by 2003/54/EC).
(Steinsdóttir et al.) The operations of major elec-
trical utilities were unbundled, calling for the
creation of legally separate entities to handle
generation (the production of electricity from
energy sources), transmission (the long distance
transportation of electricity at high voltage), and
distribution (the local delivery of electricity to
customers). For example, the National Power
Company was separated into a generation com-
pany, Landsvirkjun, and the monopoly transmis-
sion company, Landsnet. The Act established
that generation companies compete on an open
market, whereas there is only one transmission
company and local monopolies for distributors.
It was later established that transmission and
distribution are to remain in majority public
ownership.
Amendments to the Law (2008)
A 2008 act amending laws relating to
natural resources and energy (58/2008) intro-
duced several changes to the geothermal energy
legal framework. (Alþing) Comments from the
drafter, the Minister of Industry, indicate that
the changes were intended to “set forth rules
regarding ownership of state-owned resources”
with the goal of ensuring that “all the most valu-
able water and geothermal entitlements that are
in state and municipalities’ ownership stay that
way.” (Ketilsson et al., “Introducing the Con-
cept…”) The Act establishes that ownership of
resources (directly connected to land ownership
for both private and public land) can no longer
be sold by the Icelandic state, municipalities,
and/or companies owned by them. (Ketilsson et
al., “Legal Framework…”)
However, usufruct2 of the resource may
be granted for a period of up to 65 years at a
time. These usage leases allow for the possibil-
ity of privatization without compromising pub-
lic resource ownership, at least in principle.
However, a lease with such a long term may,
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2
The legal term, usufruct, refers to “the right of tem-
porary possession, use, or enjoyment of the advantages of
property belonging to another, so far as may be had with-
out causing damage or prejudice to this.” (Oxford English
Dictionary)
in practice, approach ownership, subverting the
declared goal of the legislation. Alternatively,
if ownership and leasing can truly be considered
distinct in practice, additional problems arise.
As Steinsdóttir and colleagues argue, different
utilization schemes tend to result based on
whether a resource owner or a leaseholder is the
one to utilize the resource. (Steinsdóttir et al.,
p. 19) They contend that an owner utilizes
resources with long-term benefits in mind,
whereas a leaseholder aims to extract as much
profit as possible during the term of the lease.
As a result, leaseholders are less likely to invest
in maintaining safety or the long-term efficiency
of the resource. A geothermal generation sector
based on leasing to private firms may there-
fore present regulatory and public monitoring
challenges.
Privatization of HS Orka
HS Orka is the only privately owned Ice-
landic geothermal generation company. The
company’s parent, HS, had been in public own-
ership until 2007, when the newly formed Ice-
landic investment firm Geysir Green Energy
(GGE) acquired a 32 percent share, becoming
the first private investor in the Icelandic geot-
hermal sector. (“Geysir…,” p. 3) After the
demerger of HS in early 2009, GGE moved to
increase its holdings to obtain a 66 percent
majority ownership of HS Orka.
In July of 2009, the Canadian firm Magma
Energy Corp. entered the Icelandic geother-
mal sector when its wholly owned subsidiary,
Magma Energy Sweden, A.B., purchased from
GGE a 10.8 percent share of HS Orka. Within
the next month, Magma also acquired Reykjavík
Energy’s stake in HS Orka, bringing Magma’s
ownership of HS Orka to 43.1 percent. Magma
continued its acquisition of HS Orka by pur-
chasing GGE’s remaining shares in May 2010.
As of December 2010, Magma officially held 98.5
percent of HS Orka, with the rest in munici-
pal ownership. Magma’s total investment in HS
Orka had amounted to more than 33 billion
krónur ($250 million). (“Canadian Magma
Acquires…”) Under the terms of the purchase
agreements, Magma secured the rights to
exploit geothermal resources in certain areas of
southwest Iceland for 65 years, with the possi-
bility of an additional 65-year renewal. However,
as stipulated by Icelandic law, ownership of
the resources remained with the landowners.
The annual price to be paid by HS Orka to these
landowners for use of their resources is esti-
mated at 72 million krónur ($566,000).
(“Magma Energy and…”)
Magma sold 25 percent of its shares back
to Icelandic hands in June 2011 to Jarðvarmi
slhf, a company set up specifically for the deal
by 14 Icelandic pension funds. (“Icelandic Pen-
sion…”) The sale also granted Jarðvarmi minor-
ity shareholder rights enabling the pension
funds to play an active role in running HS
Orka and the ability to own up to 50 percent
of HS Orka when future shares are offered. This
agreement resulted only after a period of intense
public and political pressure.
Political Environment
The political response to the Magma acqui-
sitions portrays Icelanders’ diverse attitudes
toward privatization and foreign ownership. The
debate highlights a variety of arguments, both
ideological and practical, concerning the
specifics of the Magma deal as well as a poten-
tially broader shift away from public owner-
ship in the future.
Left-Green Party
The Left-Green Party (which, along with
the Social Democratic Alliance, forms the cur-
rent coalition government) has been an active
opponent of Magma Energy’s position in the Ice-
landic geothermal sector. Soon after Magma’s
2009 acquisitions, Minister of Finance Steingrí-
mur Sigfússon (chair, Left-Green) stated that
his ministry was considering whether the Ice-
landic state could acquire a stake in HS Orka
in order to prevent increased ownership by
Magma Energy. In early September 2009, the
Ministries of Finance and Industry announced
the formation of a discussion group with the
goal of establishing an Icelandic investment
fund, to be owned by the pension funds, that
would invest in HS Orka in order to limit fur-
ther privatization. The Ministry of Finance
also entered into talks with Magma CEO Ross
Beaty to negotiate a shorter rental period and
a higher rental price, under the rationale that
these changes would better ensure that Ice-
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land was receiving the majority of profits from
HS Orka’s geothermal operations. (“Magma
Energy and…”) Left-Green Environment Min-
ister Svandís Svavarsdóttir has conveyed her dis-
approval of the Magma acquisitions, affirming
that she would seek legislation to revoke
Magma’s contract. She argued that the cur-
rent legislation had not been discussed thor-
oughly in society before it was passed and
encouraged the public to “make their voices
heard if they don’t want the profit from Icelandic
resources to go to private overseas compa-
nies.” (“Björk Criticizes…”)
Social Democratic Alliance
The Social Democrats, chaired by Prime
Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, have been less
critical of Magma than the Left-Green Party.
After Magma’s 2009 purchase, Minister of Indus-
try Katrín Júlíusdóttir (Social-Democrat) stated
that it was a positive development to have for-
eign investors participate in the Icelandic energy
market where it had been difficult to finance
production. (“Canadian Magma Invests…”) She
also emphasized that Magma did not gain own-
ership of geothermal resources—it is only uti-
lizing them. After Magma’s 2010 acquisitions
from GGE, she argued that the transfer of
ownership from an Icelandic to a foreign private
owner was not a major issue, as long as Ice-
landers continue to receive the profits from
their energy resources. (“Canadian Magma
Acquires…”)
However, she also engaged in talks with
Magma to shorten the lease period to 40 years
and to establish the Icelandic state’s preemptive
right to purchase stock in HS Orka. With these
measures in place, she argued, there would
not be a need for the government to intervene
in Magma’s acquisition. (“MP Considers
Suing…”) The Social Democrats have expressed
concern that disturbing the agreement with
Magma may cost the company’s investment in
Iceland, repelling other potential investors.
(“Magma Energy Sends…”) Nonetheless, they
affirmed the need to discuss and modify laws on
foreign investment through parliamentary
action.
Independence Party
The main opposition party to the coali-
tion government is the Independence Party,
which has historically supported privatization.
The initial sale of the Icelandic state’s share of
HS Orka to GGE in 2007 was under Independ-
ence-Progressive coalition leadership. Party
chair Bjarni Benediktsson has criticized the cur-
rent government for creating uncertainty and
delay in the Magma case, which in his opinion
had been on the right track and been properly
evaluated by the committee on foreign invest-
ment. (“Committee Concludes…”)
Government Involvement
Because Reykjavík Energy’s stake in HS
Orka was owned by the City of Reykjavík, the
decision to sell to Magma rested with the Reyk-
javík City Council. The Executive Committee
within the council initially approved the first
sale agreement, with the representatives from
the Independence Party and Progressive Party
in favor and the Social Democrats and Left-
Greens in opposition. A vote by the entire coun-
cil then narrowly accepted the acquisition, by
eight votes to seven. The decision was subse-
quently approved by a committee on foreign
investment.
After Magma obtained a majority share
in HS Orka, pressure to reverse the acquisi-
tion led the Prime Minister to create a task force
to reevaluate whether the purchase was con-
ducted legally and to decide whether there
was reason for the government to seek ways
to interfere. After its review, the committee con-
cluded that Magma acted in compliance with
Icelandic and EEA regulations. While the Inde-
pendence party supported the conclusion as pre-
dictable, the opposition affirmed that they would
seek other ways to renegotiate the Magma sit-
uation. (“Committee Concludes…”)
Public Reaction
Björk
Icelandic international pop star and
environmentalist Björk Guðmundsdóttir has
been a vocal critic of the Magma acquisitions,
and her activism offers a visible reflection of
some Icelanders’ attitudes toward privatiza-
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tion and foreign ownership. In May 2010, she
published a declaration in the periodical Reyk-
javík Grapevine challenging the government
of Iceland to stop the “selling off of Iceland’s
nature” and do everything in its power to revoke
Magma’s ownership of HS Orka. (“Björk Criti-
cizes…”) A formal proposal orchestrated by
Björk was submitted to the Icelandic parliament
on July 13, 2010. It enumerated the founda-
tion for Björk’s opposition and requested an
investigation of the sale to determine whether
public interest had been in any way compro-
mised. Among the concerns were that Magma
Energy Sweden was formed as a shell com-
pany to subvert Icelandic law, that Magma’s
investment would fail to produce real capital,
that the sale lacked transparency, and that pub-
lic resources were being inappropriately gam-
bled in a volatile private sector. (Guðmundsdót-
tir et al.)
Björk also organized an online petition
to campaign against the Magma acquisitions.
Publicizing the petition through numerous
press conferences and a nationwide karaoke
marathon, she raised nearly 50,000 signatures
(approximately 1/6 of Iceland’s total population)
by January 2011. Because Prime Minister
Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir had agreed to seri-
ously consider the petition if the support of 15
percent of voters (approximately 35,000 people)
could be obtained, she and Finance Minister Ste-
ingrimur Sigfusson consequently met with
Björk and fellow campaigners to discuss possi-
ble actions, which did not exclude the option
of seizing Magma’s assets by eminent domain.
(“Björk Hands…”)
Björk and Magma CEO Ross Beaty have
exchanged several communications through the
Icelandic press. In one passage, Beaty attempted
to answer questions that Björk had raised in her
proposal to parliament, offering figures to
provide greater transparency and discussing
Magma’s intentions. (Magnússon) He also
expressed disappointment in the way that
Magma had been received by Iceland, affirm-
ing Magma’s goals to tangibly benefit Iceland
and be a responsible corporate citizen. He
directly addressed the concern over Magma’s
need to create a Swedish subsidiary, arguing
that this approach was used to comply with Ice-
landic law rather than to subvert it.
Björk’s responses affirmed her belief
that the selling price of HS Orka offered a
poor deal for Icelanders, abusing Iceland’s weak
financial position. She implied that Beaty
operates predatory operations, pointing to
allegedly exploitative management in Beaty’s
Pan American Silver in Peru, and remarking
that Beaty’s companies tend to show up in weak-
ened countries when they have needed Interna-
tional Monetary Fund assistance. Björk also
asserted that nationality was not the issue,
saying that after the financial collapse, Ice-
landers distrust even their own people in risky
private ventures. Finally, she informed Magma
that Icelanders “are not ready for you… not
ready to become an energy colony” and stressed
that the nation must first be given a chance to
decide as a whole whether to privatize. (Guð-
mundsdóttir)
Public Opinion Polls
Although Icelanders’ response to the Björk
petition offers one indication of their attitude
toward Magma Energy, foreign investment, and
privatization, a Gallup poll from 2009 (by Nordic
management consultancy firm Capacent) pro-
vides additional insight. (“Foreign Invest-
ment…”) In a sample of the general population,
81 percent responded that foreign investment
was important for Iceland’s economy and 70 per-
cent were generally in favor of foreign invest-
ment. However, when asked specifically about
the energy sector, the response was less positive:
50.2 percent of the general public against,
29.3 percent in favor, and 20.5 percent unde-
cided. Respondents were then asked whether
their opinion differed if they were ensured
that the resource was to remain in Icelandic
hands with a fair fee paid for its utilization.
Reactions improved slightly, with 44 percent
of the general public opposed and 56 percent
in favor. Results were similar for questions about
investment in the fishing industry, demonstrat-
ing Icelanders’ reluctance to admit foreign
investment in areas involving natural resources.
Evaluation
The principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources (PSNR) is a recognized fea-
ture of international law3 that establishes a
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nation’s people as the ultimate owner and con-
troller of the nation’s natural resources.
(Duruigbo) While often applied to cases involv-
ing resource abuse by kleptocratic rulers in
developing countries, PSNR is also relevant to
resource-rich developed nations such as Iceland.
As Duruigbo argues, the people’s sovereignty
over resources imparts a duty on the state to
manage these resources to the maximum ben-
efit of the people. Furthermore, PSNR empow-
ers a people to “reject or challenge agreements
between foreign corporations and governments
where the provisions or application of such con-
tracts are inimical to their interests.” The case
of Magma Energy and the broader issue of
energy privatization in Iceland ultimately rep-
resent a debate regarding sovereignty over
natural resources. Indicators of public opin-
ion, such as the Björk petition and poll results,
suggest that a significant portion of the popu-
lation disagrees with the government’s cur-
rent energy policy. PSNR, therefore, dictates
that the Icelandic state, in its role as steward
of the peoples’ resources, reevaluate the struc-
ture of the energy sector to ensure that it func-
tions for the maximum good of the people.
The sale of HS Orka represents more
than just a business deal between two firms. It
sets a critical precedent for how Iceland’s
resources will be managed for future genera-
tions. Considering its widespread implica-
tions, the decision whether to privatize and
allow foreign ownership should be made with
a strategic and unified outlook that takes into
account not only reactions within Iceland but
also the experiences of other nations where
the consequences of privatization have had
more time to be revealed.
Global Comparisons
The EU electricity directives of 1996 and
2003 aimed to create a cross-national European
market for electricity in which consumers are
free to choose among competitive firms in their
own and neighboring countries. In response,
reform strategies have consisted, in general
terms, of a three-fold approach: privatization of
publicly owned firms, unbundling of vertically
integrated companies (separation of generation,
transmission, distribution, and retail), and lib-
eralization4 to provide competition in genera-
tion and retail. The traditional argument is that
private firms intrinsically have incentive to be
more efficient than public companies in order
to maximize profit in a competitive environ-
ment. (Fiorio et al., pp. 5-6) Unbundling
enhances competition by isolating the poten-
tially competitive stages of generation and retail
from the natural monopolies of transmission
and distribution. Then, liberalization allows
competitive entrants into the market, foster-
ing efficiency and driving down prices to end-
users.
However, according to Jamasb and Pol-
litt, the three reform thrusts are not necessar-
ily that closely intertwined. Privatization is
not a prerequisite for liberalization, and com-
petition and incentive regulation can be applied
to publicly owned enterprises, as is the case in
Norway. Furthermore, although privatization
has often been attendant to energy reform,
the EU directives do not specifically advocate it.
A 2007 study by Fiorio and colleagues
explores the restructuring of the energy indus-
try across the EU over the past 20 years, eval-
uating in particular the direct effects of priva-
tization as part of a larger reform paradigm
“based on increased confidence in market forces
and private ownership against the decline in
planning and public ownership.” (Fiorio et al.,
p. 5) The study’s empirical results reject the con-
tention that privatization leads to lower electric-
ity prices and establishes that customer satis-
faction about prices and quality of services is
higher with public ownership than with private.
(Fiorio et al., p. 7) Supporting evidence includes
studies showing that electricity prices in the
highly privatized UK market are between 10 per-
cent and 20 percent higher than they would
have been without privatization. (Branston) In
a broader review, the experiences of many
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development countries indicate the failure of
privatization reform to achieve its intended
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3The legal origin of PSNR lies in UN General Assem-
bly Resolution 626 (VII) of December 21, 1952 (Right to
Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources), and the con-
cept is more fully expressed in General Assembly Resolution
1803 (XVII) of 1962. (Duruigbo)
4The use of the term liberalization in energy policy
varies. Here, liberalization refers specifically to allowing
entry and competition in generation and retail. (Fiorio et
al., p. 4)
objectives; rather, the results have been “higher
prices, lower or unchanged efficiency, less use
of renewable energy, inadequate investment in
generating capacity and network infrastructure,
and a worse experience for consumers—includ-
ing industrial consumers.” (Hall et al., p. 3) This
evidence suggests that from an economic stand-
point, Icelandic citizens and firms may not stand
to benefit from a national policy that allows or
encourages extensive privatization of the geot-
hermal energy sector. Furthermore, a society’s
debate over ownership structure is more about
achieving the “desired balance of economic and
political powers than about efficiency and com-
petition.” (Fiorio et al., p. 40)
Nonetheless, public ownership does not
preclude the existence of competition in the
energy market. Already, geothermal electricity
producers compete not only among themselves
but also with hydroelectric generation firms.
However, Iceland faces special challenges in fos-
tering competition because of its small mar-
ket size and geographic isolation from the Euro-
pean electricity market. (Hreinsson,
“Requirements…”) Facing a similar lack of mar-
ket participants, New Zealand was forced to rein-
state regulation of its privatized power sector in
2003. (Meisen and Garzke, p. 13) Iceland must
therefore focus on fostering an open and viable
trading market that enables and encourages
users (both residential and industrial) to freely
choose among a range of competitive suppliers.
A functional market also would enable Ice-
landers to vote with their money—if they oppose
privatization, consumers could choose to pur-
chase energy solely from public generators.
The Norwegian Example
Norway’s management of natural resources
has been regarded positively in the interna-
tional community (Duruigbo) and may serve as
a fruitful example as Iceland considers changes
to its energy sector. Norway’s extensive utiliza-
tion of hydropower strengthens the compari-
son with Iceland not only because of Iceland’s
large hydropower sector but also because
hydropower and geothermal resources present
similar usage schemes in that they must be
exploited at the source rather than transported
to the demand site. The hallmark of the Norwe-
gian power sector is “the combination of large-
scale public ownership and a diversity of vari-
ous participants.” (“Facts 2008...,” p. 76) For
example, the generation sector is 88 percent pub-
licly owned, with 174 different companies gener-
ating electricity, 21 of which are engaged solely
in generation. The central grid is also largely pub-
lic, with the central government owning 87
percent. The limited number of foreign-owned
firms is concentrated mainly in trading.
The Norwegian government has established
legislation to preserve public control over energy
resources and to encourage restructuring from
private to public sector ownership. (“Facts
2008...,” p. 64) Revisions in 2008 legally estab-
lished that Norway’s hydropower resources
belong to the general public and must be admin-
istered according to the public’s best interest and
structured consistent with the principle of pub-
lic ownership. One feature is the right of rever-
sion (originally established in 1917), which
means that the state assumes ownership of a
waterfall and hydroelectric installations free of
charge when a license expires. The acquisition of
such reverted properties is then restricted to pub-
lic entities. In addition, new licenses may only be
granted to public-sector owners. The legisla-
tion also caps the overall extent of private own-
ership, preventing the sale of more than one third
of publicly owned plants.
Norway’s example demonstrates that a
highly competitive national market can be sup-
ported in an industry based on public ownership.
(Fiorio et al., p. 36) In fact, Norway was the
first country in the world to allow customers to
freely choose their electricity supplier (“Facts
2008...,” p. 66) and is considered one of the
most open electricity markets in the world.
(Meisen and Garzke, p. 12) Norwegian legislation
also presents a precedent on which Icelandic
reforms can be built. For instance, a cap on
private and foreign ownership could more clearly
preserve national control over geothermal
resources while still allowing for the possibility
of economic benefits derived from foreign direct
investment.
Outlook
Iceland stands at a crossroads. As energy-
related concerns continue to command greater
attention in the national and international con-
sciousness, should private and foreign interests
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be allowed to play a larger role in the Icelandic
geothermal energy sector? Or should Iceland
work to more firmly establish and preserve a sys-
tem based on publicly managed energy
resources? Global comparisons suggest that elec-
tricity privatization is detrimental, resulting in
higher prices and lower customer value. Further-
more, the Norwegian example demonstrates that
an electricity sector based on renewable resources
and public ownership can thrive in a Nordic soci-
ety. Given the sentiments expressed by a large
proportion of Icelanders, reforms to ensure
that the Icelandic people continue to own, con-
trol, and benefit from their geothermal resources
are important to preserve the nation’s prosperity.
Icelanders continue to recover from the
unforeseen consequences of insufficiently man-
aged financial deregulation. A parallel outcome
in the geothermal sector can be avoided with a
cautious approach that provides greater struc-
ture, control, and transparency to Iceland’s
energy policy. Limitations on the extent of pri-
vate and foreign ownership would maintain pub-
lic control while enabling investment. Shorten-
ing utilization lease terms (while stipulating
sustainable use practices) would promote
accountability and competitiveness among gen-
erators. Fostering a more effective trading mar-
ket would enhance the ability of market forces to
promote efficiency and low prices. Finally, enforc-
ing better transparency and bidding in future pri-
vatization transactions would ensure fair valua-
tion of Iceland’s geothermal resources.
Before the start of the 2010-2011 parlia-
mentary session, the Prime Minister announced
a list of the top 20 issues on which the legislature
planned to focus. Second only to stabilizing the
employment market was the goal of establishing
a new and overall policy in matters concerning
energy and natural resources. (“Iceland’s PM…”)
It is imperative that the government hold true to
its aim. Icelanders are a people determined to
protect their nation’s natural resources. They
fought for their fisheries in the Cod Wars and will
work with the same spirit to protect the valuable
energy beneath their feet. With diligence in the
democratic arena, Iceland can renew responsible
stewardship of its geothermal energy resources
for future generations.
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